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The Guardianship Dilemma: Regime Security through and from the
Armed Forces
R. BLAKE MCMAHON and BRANISLAV L. SLANTCHEV
University of California–San Diego
Armed forces strong enough to protect the state also pose a threat to the state. We develop a modelthat distills this “Guardianship Dilemma” to its barest essentials, and show that the seeminglyironclad logic underlyingour existingunderstandingof civil-military relations is flawed.Militaries
contemplating disloyalty must worry about both successfully overthrowing the government and defeating
the state’s opponent. This twin challenge induces loyalty as the state faces increasingly strong external
threats, and can bemanaged effectively by rulers using a number of policy levers. Disloyalty can still occur
when political and military elites hold divergent beliefs about the threat environment facing the state,
since militaries will sometimes have less incentive to remain loyal than the ruler suspects. Consequently,
it is not the need to respond to external threats that raises the risk of disloyalty—as conventional wisdom
suggests—but rather uncertainty about the severity of these threats.
M ercenary captains are either excellent men ofarms or not: if they are, you cannot trust thembecause they always aspire to their own great-
ness, either by oppressing you, who are their patron, or
by oppressing others contrary to your intention; but if the
captain is not virtuous, he ruins you in the ordinary way.
Machiavelli, The Prince, XII
Rulers govern in an environment characterized by
foreign anddomestic threats, andmust provide for their
security if they are to survive in power. The state must
therefore rely on a coercive force—one that special-
izes in dealing with foreign adversaries and another
that focuses on internal ones or, as for most of history,
one that could be used for either—an agent powerful
enough to cope with these challenges, a “guardian”
of the government. This existential imperative gives
rise to one of the oldest dilemmas of governing, for
a guardian strong enough to protect the government
is also strong enough to impose its own preferences
on the polity. Paradoxically, the attempt to cope with
some types of threats can generate a new, and often
very serious, threat. This Guardianship Dilemma can
be resolved in two ways: the government either creates
the forces it needs and takes its chances that they may
turn on it or avoids that danger altogether by leaving
itself exposed to the other threats. The more grave
these other threats are, the more likely is the govern-
ment to accept the risks of guardianship and opt for the
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creation of a military force (Feaver 1999; Huntington
1957; Svolik 2012).
The unfortunate tradeoff for regime security implied
by theGuardianshipDilemma is seen as a fundamental
feature of civil-military relations, to the point where
it has become an unstated assumption. As a result,
most research on the subject explores the ways in
which governments can maintain the necessary forces
without running the risks of becoming their servant or
getting eliminated altogether. The remedies suggested
range from institutional checks andbalanceswith coun-
tervailing forces to placing limits on budgets or the
competence of military leaders, and from imposing or-
ganizational straight-jackets through manipulating the
chain of command, recruitment, or interagency com-
munications to the fostering of a separate apolitical
professional culture in the military (Egorov and Sonin
2011; Finer 1988; Pilster and Boehmelt 2011; Quinlivan
1999).
But is the ancient logic underlying the Guardianship
Dilemma compelling?We present a model of the inter-
action between the government and its military force
that is starkly reduced to the barest essentials identified
by the dilemma and show that, as commonly posed, the
dilemma is flawed because it fails to account for the
effect of the threat environment on the incentives of
the guardians to interfere with politics. Because armed
forces that intervene in politics must both successfully
execute a coup and fend off other challengers, grave
threats to the existing government can induce military
loyalty.While theGuardianshipDilemma predicts that
rulers are at greatest risk of a coup when some threat
forces them to strengthen their militaries, we show that
when these leaders are aware of the extent of this
threat, it is, in fact, precisely the serious threat that
permits them to pour resources into the military with-
out fearing that it will become disloyal. This finding is
consistentwith the pathbreakingwork ofDesch (1999),
who argues that large external threats help political
leaders maintain control of the armed forces. In con-
trast to Desch, however, our model also reveals that
when rulers know the threat’s severity, it is possible
to devise a combination of benefits that increase the
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military’s value of remaining loyal and constraints that
hinder its ability to fight, such that military loyalty is
assured under all conditions. The dilemma is always
resolved in favor of regime stability regardless of the
size of the threat, although sometimes this happens at
the expense of the military’s effectiveness.
This indicates that to trigger the full power of the
dilemma, another factor needs to be considered: some-
thing that prevents rulers from succeeding in the del-
icate balancing act between having an overweening
military that might overthrow them and having an im-
potent one that might be useless against the threat.
We argue that this necessary factor is asymmetric in-
formation about the threat environment, a type of
uncertainty inherent in civil-military relations. When
the military is better informed about the extent of the
threat facing the polity than the rulers—a discrepancy
that could arise for a variety of reasons, as we explain
below—the delicate balancing act can become well-
nigh impossible.
We show that under general conditions rulers must
end up with one of two unpleasant realities. If they
decide that the threat is likely to be small, the military
is endowed with just enough resources to deal with
small threats. Whereas this ensures the military’s loy-
alty in all circumstances, the military will be woefully
unprepared if the politicians were too optimistic and
the actual threat turns out to be large. If, on the other
hand, rulers decide that the threat is likely to be large,
they are hit with a double whammy: in their fear of
a coup, rulers still handicap the military and reduce
its effectiveness in dealing with the large threat, but
because they are also fearful of the threat itself, rulers
still endow the military with enough resources to in-
duce its disloyalty if the threat happens to be small.
In this case, the military is both ineffective against the
serious threat and a danger to the regime if the rulers’
estimates prove to be too pessimistic.
Thus, the Guardianship Dilemma arises because of a
mismatch between themilitary’s strength and the threat it
is supposed to deal with—if the military is underfunded,
it will be loyal but deficient, and if it is overfunded, it
will be effective but potentially disloyal—and the mis-
match itself is caused by the divergent beliefs about the
seriousness of the threat among the political and mili-
tary leaders. This divergence can be a product of the
military’s specialization in dealing with threats, which
entails access to superior intelligence and information
processing when it comes to estimating potential dan-
gers to the polity. The closer the rulers get to the mili-
tary’s own estimates about the threat, the narrower the
belief gap, and the weaker the dilemma.
Our model, reduced though it is, allows us to qualify
some of the claims that are often made in studies of
civil-military relations. For example, it is often argued
that in making military appointments, nondemocratic
leaders prefer to select for loyalty rather than compe-
tence, and that as a result their armed forces are fre-
quently quite ineffective on the battlefield. We explain
why this line of reasoning is problematic. Competence
and resources are both means to an end—higher prob-
ability of success in a military confrontation, be it with
the threat or in a coup. But while competence is “free”
from the perspective of the rulers, resources most cer-
tainly are not. Thus, it is always preferable to improve
the efficiency of the military by hiring competent of-
ficers and reducing its resources than to hire incom-
petents who may be loyal but who will also squander
valuable resources. We provide empirical evidence for
our argument by examining the fate of high-ranking
officers in Saddam Hussein’s military in the aftermath
of the Iran-Iraq War.
THE GUARDIANSHIP DILEMMA
The Guardianship Dilemma has plagued regimes for
centuries, and has proven a tough challenge even dur-
ing the last century, when militaries deposed more
rulers than all other forms of political instability com-
bined. Between 1945 and 2002, more than two-thirds
of the extraconstitutional leadership changes in dic-
tatorships were caused by coups d’etat (Svolik 2009).
Even among all leaderships changes between 1919 and
2004, the 260 coups represent nearly 9% (Goemans,
Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009).
The Guardianship Dilemma depends on the threat
environment faced by states’ political regimes: stronger
external threats increase the need for a powerful mil-
itary, but the more powerful the military, the more
dangerous it can be to the regime’s political autonomy
and even its survival (Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni
2008; Feaver 1999; Finer 1988; Huntington 1957; Svolik
2012).
Some exceptional studies do hold that the strong for-
eign threats can enhance civilian control of the armed
forces. Desch (1999) argues that civil-military rela-
tions depend on the nature of the threat environment
faced by the state. Civilians have greatest control over
the military when the state faces grave international
threats, and least control when the state must deal with
domestic challenges. Staniland (2008) adds that this re-
lationship depends on the extent to which the regime is
deemed legitimate and is adequately institutionalized.
It is not, however, clear why one should expect mili-
taries to have the least influence over policy when their
services are in highest demand, or why domestic and
international threats should have such dramatically dif-
ferent effects on civil-military relations.
Rulers whoworry about their ownmilitaries do have
another option at their disposal: they can purposefully
limit the strength of their armed forces, leaving them
tooweak tomount a coup but alsomaking themgrossly
ineffective against the external threat (Feaver 1996;
Svolik 2013, 154). At its most extreme, this strategy
could deprive the state of a military altogether, as it
has done in Costa Rica and some remote island states
such as Kiribati and Samoa. More realistically though,
most rulers must content themselves with finding ways
ofmaintaining reasonably useful guardians without be-
coming their victims. This is what nearly all studies
of civil-military relations investigate as well. Strategies
discussed vary from institutional constraints involving
limitations on the autonomy of military organizations
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and the creation of parallel armed forces, to efforts to
control the disposition of military agents by providing
patronage or by fostering a professional culture among
military personnel (Finer 1988; Pilster and Boehmelt
2011; Powell 2012; Quinlivan 1999).
A key strategy for ensuring the loyalty of militaries
is to control the membership of the officer corps. The
calculus for rulers in this context is straightforward:
where the loyalty of potential guardiansmight be ques-
tionable, appoint those for whom the status quo is
most profitable and who will therefore have the weak-
est incentives to overthrow the ruler. These privileged
groups are generally among the regime’s “communi-
ties of trust” (Enloe 1975; Quinlivan 1999). Saddam
Hussein, for instance, pulled heavily from his minor-
ity Sunni-Arab ethnoreligious group when selecting
personnel for the Iraqi security apparatus (al-Marashi
2002). Scholars have often argued that making these
personnel decisions on the basis of implied loyalty
rather that competence can seriously erode themilitary
effectiveness of the armed forces (Brooks 1998; Gaub
2013; Huntington 1957, 231–2). Some have even gone
as far as suggesting that rulers might actually recruit
less competent officers on purpose as a means of en-
suring their loyalty (Egorov and Sonin 2011). We shall
have an occasion to address these particular claims.
While the logic of the Guardianship Dilemma serves
as the foundation of our existing understanding of
civil-military relations, one must wonder if this logic
is convincing. Most of the work that explores this logic
explicitly suggests that the problem turns on the abil-
ity of the rulership to commit to resource transfers or
policy concessions to the military. A failure to manage
the dilemma then reflects features of the social, politi-
cal, or economic environment that prevent rulers from
making credible promises to their guardians. Besley
and Robinson (2010) argue that if social conflict over
public spending is serious enough, rulers cannot com-
mit to paying a wage that is sufficiently high to ensure
military loyalty when the armed forces are optimally
sized. The ruler’s best response is to limit the size of
the armed forces and avoid a coup altogether at the cost
of having a weaker military. Leaving aside the question
of why authoritarian rulers would be unable to secure
sufficient resources for the military, the theory can-
not explain why coups occur; after all, the equilibrium
probability of a coup is zero.
Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2008) do tackle this
question head on. In their view, the transition from au-
tocracy to democracy can end in a coup because the in-
coming democratic regime no longer needs a well-paid
military for internal repression. Since the democratic
government cannot credibly commit not to reform the
military after it comes to power, the military has incen-
tives to prevent the transition. It is, however, unclear
why the government would not be able to make such
a commitment: since the military cannot be disbanded
overnight, the continuing threat of a coup should give
the government enough reasons to maintain the high
wages.
Other studies suggest that the problem arises from
political or military elites holding private informa-
tion about relevant features of the strategic environ-
ment. Informational asymmetries are common in civil-
military politics, reflecting the functional differentia-
tion in tasks between political and military actors, and
are troublesome to the extent that militaries and politi-
cal regimes have dissimilar preferences over outcomes
(Brooks 2008). Svolik (2013, 2012) argues that mili-
taries leverage their coercive power to demand favor-
able policies from the regime. Coups can occur when
themilitary believes that the ruler has reneged on their
agreement, which can happen because the military
lacks complete information about the government’s
activities. However, even though some policies might
be opaque to the military, most large issues—such as
themilitary’s budget or regulations affecting the armed
forces—tend to be highly visible and the policies them-
selves formulated with the active participation of the
military.
In this respect, Egorov and Sonin’s (2011) assump-
tion that the ruler’s agent (“vizier”) has private infor-
mation about the threat environment is much more
plausible. A competent agent is more likely to observe
whether the enemy is weak, and so its incentive to
betray the ruler by doing nothing to counter that threat
is higher. To counter this, the ruler hires a less compe-
tent agent and since the expected loyalty is higher, the
required pay is lower. The only reason the ruler does
not hire total dolts is because their inability to distin-
guish whether the enemy is weak would cause them to
squander valuable resources. One might wonder about
a notion of competence that is unrelated to the agent’s
ability to defeat the enemy. After all, if the enemy is
more likely to prevail in thepresenceof an incompetent
vizier, the ruler’s money-saving imperative that drives
down his desire to hire a competent agent will be, well,
much less imperative.
In order to assess the logic of the Guardianship
Dilemma, we distill the dilemma to the most essen-
tial characteristics identified by previous research: (1)
The leaders of political regimes must defend against
external threats. Unfortunately for them, the guardians
appointed to defend the state can also be a threat to
the regime. (2) Rulers have the “power of the purse,”
and manage the flow of resources to the armed forces
in response to both external threats and the risk of a
coup. (3) Rulers control who is charged with running
the state’s armed forces, andmay select these agents on
the basis of both competence and their affiliation with
a social, political, or economic group. (4) The more
competent the military agents, the more likely they are
to prevail against the external threat and against the
ruler should they choose to execute a coup.
MODEL
Consider a model with two players, R (ruler of the
political regime) and G (general).1 The status quo dis-
tribution of benefits in this society privileges certain
1 For simplicity, we shall refer to the ruler as “she” and the general
as “he.’
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groups over others, and may be based on ethnicity,
religion, geography, or other cleavages within the state.
In SouthAfrica duringApartheid, for example, a racial
divide between whites and nonwhites determined ac-
cess to social, political, and economic opportunities
(Thompson 2001). For the sake of parsimony, we ab-
stract away from the precise nature of these cleavages
and assume simply that the benefit a member of some
group i derives from the status quo is bi ∈ [b,b] such
that 0 < b< b< 1. Some groups have higher status
quo benefits than others, so their incentive to over-
throw the regime will be weaker. Ugandan ruler Mil-
ton Obote was a Northerner, and knew that for fellow
Northerners, a coup to address ethnic grievanceswould
be unnecessary. The loyalty of the alienated Southern-
ers, in contrast, was far more questionable (Horowitz
1985, 488, 501). These status quo benefits are normal-
ized such that 0 represents obtaining nothing (e.g., be-
cause one is dead or in prison) and 1 represents the
maximal benefit of personal rule. We shall further nor-
malize R’s competence to 1, and her security resources
to 1.
The timing of the game is as follows. The ruler
chooses the group from which to pick the general, bi,
his level of competence, θ ∈ [0, θ], and the amount of
military resources tomake available to him,m≥ 0. The
marginal cost of giving the general a unit of military
resource is 1. All these parameters are observable by
the ruler when making her choices, and known to the
general selected.
Powerful, well-endowed military forces are more
likely to succeed in battle against an external threat.
However, if the military attempts a coup, strong forces
are also more likely to overcome the defenses that pro-
tect the regime, such as paramilitary units and progov-
ernment militias, and can more easily capture strategic
targets and members of the government (Powell 2012,
1024). Furthermore, the ability of competent military
leaders to marshal forces effectively is vital when the
government faces external threats, but can be partic-
ularly dangerous if cunning generals turn against the
regime. Returning again to the case of Uganda, Milton
Obote began to fear General Idi Amin’s wiles. When
the threat posed by Amin to the regime became clear
enough, Obote demoted the general in an attempt to
limit his influence (Horowitz 1985).
We represent the probability that an actor of com-
petence θ in control of military resources m1 prevails
against an opponent—here, either the external threat
or the ruler’s own defenses—with resources m2 with
the familiar ratio contest-success function:
p(m1,m2; θ) = θm1
θm1 +m2 .
Following the ruler’s choice of a general and mili-
tary resources, the selected general decides whether to
execute a coup or remain loyal. If he executes a coup,
he takes over with probability p(m, 1; θ), in which case
his eventual benefit goes to 1, and he is defeated with
complementary probability, in which case his benefit
goes to 0. The coup is costly for the general: c > 0.
After the coup decision, the external threat of size
T> 0 is realized. It is important to note that by “ex-
ternal” threat, we mean any threat from outside of
the government—whether foreign or domestic—that
threatens the survival of the rulership.2 If the general
is still around when this threat is faced (because he
remained loyal or after a successful coup), he defeats
this threat with probability p(m,T; θ), in which case he
obtains his benefit (bi if he was loyal to the ruler and
1 if he took over in a coup), and he is defeated with
complementary probability, in which case his benefit is
0. If the general was removed after an attempted coup,
the ruler herself faces the external threat, and defeats
it with probability p(m,T; 1), in which case she retains
power with a benefit of 1, and is herself defeated with
complementary probability, in which case her benefit
is 0.
The highest expected payoff from a coup in the ab-
sence of an external threat is when there is no risk:
1− c. If G would not want to execute a coup even
when a favorable outcome is certain, then he will al-
ways remain loyal irrespective of his competence and
resources. To make the model interesting, we shall as-
sume that G’s loyalty is not so easily ensured:
Assumption 1 Every general is a would-be ruler: b+
c < 1.
We also make several additional assumptions be-
causewewant to focus on the basic tension between se-
curity against external threats and security against the
force that is supposed to defend against these threats.
Some are made for technical convenience and have no
bearing on the results, while others can be defended on
empirical grounds.
First, the benefit of membership in some group, bi, is
fixed and not borne by the ruler. We can think of this
parameter as the consequence of social, economic, and
legal institutions underpinning the order in the polity,
and as such not really available to the ruler for private
consumption. It is the “cost of doing business” and it is
not the case that if the ruler picks a general from a less
advantaged stratum then she would be saving on that
cost.
Second, the ruler pays the cost of resources she trans-
fers to the general but there is no budget constraint. It
is highly unlikely that any particular general would be
so expensive to get as to trigger a budget constraint,
or that rulers are particularly constrained by budgets
when it comes to their desire to endow the military
with resources. If we were to assume that there was
a hard budget constraint, then we might find that the
ruler limits the size of the military because of poverty,
and not because of any security issues, which is the goal
of our analysis. As a result, even if one wanted to intro-
duce a budget constraint, one would have to argue that
2 We adopt a broad conception of the external threat in order to un-
derstand the fundamental dynamic illuminated by the model. Once
we have done this, we can ask how international and domestic threats
might differ in relevant ways.
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it would bind, and even when it does bind all it will do
is introduce a cap on military allocations, suppressing
the mechanism we have in mind. We do assume that
these transfers are costly, so there is a disincentive to
put too much into the military, but as we shall see this
is not going to be the concern in general.
Third, the ruler pays no cost if a coup occurs. Al-
ternatively, the ruler can be assumed to pay a cost if a
coup occurs without altering anything in the analysis
except carrying another parameter across all calcula-
tions. The fact that a coup can depose her with positive
probability is already an inducement for her to want
to avoid it. Adding extra costs simply strengthens an
incentive that is already present (and, as we shall see,
quite strong). We do want to consider costs for the
general, however, because he has to make a decision
about executing a coup, and because these costs might
represent institutional features of the existing regime
that need to be taken into account.
Fourth, neither the ruler nor the general pay any
costs when they fight the external threat. This assump-
tion is consistent with the structure of themodel, which
allows for no choice to avoid that threat: the ruler sim-
plymust deal with it. Since the size of the threat already
allows us to capture just how bad it could be for her,
there is no need to introduce additional costs.3
Fifth, both the ruler and the general are constrained
in that they can only use the available military forces
m to deal with the external threat (in effect, the ruler’s
internal security designed to deal with coup attempts is
not useful against external threats). This might appear
too restrictive because it seems to disregard strategies
the ruler could use to decrease the incentives for a coup.
Such coup-proofing tactics could involve increasing the
resources devoted to internal security, making it diffi-
cult for military units to coordinate and communicate
without passing through centralized channels, dispers-
ing units or staffing them with nonlocals, and others.
Thesemeasureswould decrease the probability of coup
success at any level of military resources and increase
the costs of launching one.
While our cost parameter can capture some aspects
of these tactics, it cannot capture others. We could
model the effect of such tactics on the probability
of coup success with the resources available to the
ruler’s internal security forces or her competence, but
we have normalized them both. The results will not
change if we were to use variables instead as long as
we take them as given. In other words, if we think of the
Guardianship Dilemma in the context of the ruler hav-
ing done everything possible to minimize the internal
dangers, our analysis follows without any changes. The
only downside is that one could not take the model to
data where these coup-proofingmeasures vary without
some straightforward modifications that will not alter
any of the substance of our argument.
3 Moreover, if we were to introduce costs of fighting, we have to be
careful with the general’s payoff if he is eliminated in a coup. Since
he would face no enemy when the coup attempt fails, if the costs
of fighting the enemy are sufficiently high, he would execute a coup
simply because of the chance of failure that would allow him to evade
paying these costs.
This assumption might also be criticized on grounds
that internal security forces may improve the state’s
ability to defeat an external threat by augmenting the
might of the regular military. We could account for this
possibility by incorporating the ruler’s own internal
security resources in the probability of success against
T. Because thismerely involves adding a constant, how-
ever, our analysis will not change. We are also doubtful
about whether this addition would be appropriate. For
instance, onemight follow Svolik (2012), whomakes an
empirical claim that the army is only generally useful
for dealing with mass revolts or foreign forces. In most
states—especially dictatorships—the day-to-day secu-
rity is managed by another apparatus, whose personnel
are generally not useful for large-scale operations. One
could also point out that some coup-proofingmeasures
(e.g., making it difficult for the commanders to coordi-
nate) might actually have a detrimental effect on the
state’s ability to defeat the external threat.
Sixth, the resources given to the military are equally
useful for a coup and for fighting the external threat.
One might question this on two grounds: it could be
that resources are not fungible, and even if they are,
they might be useful only in one of the two situations.
For example, salaries, health and pension benefits, and
payments to civilian contractors are certainly included
in military budgets, but they are not likely to increase
the fighting ability directly. Spending on some types of
technologies could improve the fighting ability when it
comes to the external threat without being very useful
in a coup. Submarines and fighter jets might belong to
that category.
Although both points are doubtless correct, they
have only tangential bearing on the Guardianship
Dilemma. Since the first type of spending will affect the
incentive to launch a coup through the benefits derived
from the existing regime, its effects can be approxi-
mated by the benefit parameter bi. The only difference,
of course, is that since these payments are part of the
budget, they would be costly to the ruler. Under the
no budget constraint assumption, this would merely
result in another parameter being subtracted from the
ruler’s payoff, necessitating further assumptions about
the marginal costs of these funds, and perhaps restric-
tions that ensure an interior solution. That solution,
however, is not going to produce any difference in the
dynamics we study.
Finally, onemight wonder about the assumption that
more resources given to the military must necessarily
increase its ability to prevail in a coup, as built into the
functional form of p(·). From the perspective of any
coup-plotters, there are some fundamental problems
that they would need to overcome before having any
chance of success: collective action and coordination
problems that arise from incentives to renege on the
plot and the necessity of conducting preparations in
secrecy, as well as the absolutely critical question about
securing the cooperation or at least neutralizing the
units in the armed forces that were not privy to the
coup (Luttwak 1979). Very plausibly, these problems,
and especially the latter, might be quite aggravated by
the size and complexity of the armed forces. In other
301
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words, it could be that beyond some level, the larger
and more organizationally complex the military, the
harder it is for any general to organize a coup. (Such
a dynamic could account for the political quiescence
of the armies of the Soviet Union, North Korea, and
China.) While this is certainly an intriguing possibility,
we believe that such a “pacifying” dynamic would have
to be quite exceptional as most countries do not have
the population base tomaintain large armies. Note also
that an attempt to construct and maintain an army of
sufficient size would probably run afoul of resource
constraints.
In the end, ours is emphatically not a general model
of coups. We do not study how coups are organized
and how they succeed (Sutter 2000). Our interest is
in the fundamental Guardianship Dilemma, which has
to be analyzed prior to dealing with any strategies for
ameliorating its effects. To this end, we have stripped
the model of any factors that are not essential to the
dilemma, and whose presence might obscure rather
than clarify its logic.
KNOWN EXTERNAL THREAT
We shall begin our analysis with the case where T> 0
is common knowledge. If R does not hire a gen-
eral, then there is no threat of a coup, so R’s pay-
off is p(m,T; 1)−m; i.e., she simply has to meet the
threat with her own competence and the resources
she has allocated. Maximizing this payoff yields m˜=
max(0,
√
T− T). In any equilibrium in which G gets
hired, R’s expected payoff must exceed the baseline of
p(m˜,T; 1)− m˜. This immediately implies that no coup
can occur in equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, R’s
expected payoff would be
p(1, θm; 1)p(m,T; 1)−m< p(m,T; 1)
−m≤ p(m˜,T; 1)− m˜,
which means that she would strictly prefer not to hire
a general in the first place. The only equilibrium pos-
sibilities, then, are that either no coup occurs at all or
one occurs with positive probability less than 1. The
following result (all proofs are in Online Appendix A)
shows, among other things, that a coup can never occur
in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium, G remains loyal if, and
only if, T ≥ T∗i (m, θ), where
T∗i (m, θ) =
(
θm
c
)[
θm
θm+ 1 − (bi + c)
]
, (1)
with T∗i increasing in both parameters whenever it is
non-negative. 
This immediately tells us that ifGwould remain loyal
in the absence of an external threat, then hewill remain
loyal in the presence of such a threat irrespective of
its size. If, on the other hand, G would be disloyal in
the absence of an external threat, then he will execute
a coup in the presence of an external threat only if
this threat is not too large T< T∗i (m, θ). In this sense,
sufficiently grave external threats can discipline even
a potentially disloyal general and deter him from ex-
ecuting a coup, a sort of “circling the wagons” effect.
This effect is due to the fact that the general only wants
to take the risks and pay the costs of a coup when
he is sufficiently confident about surviving the conflict
with T, since survival is necessary to reap the benefits
of ruling the state. In turn, as T increases, the loyalty-
inducing effect of this external threat allows the ruler
to pour additional resources into the military without
triggering a coup.
Moreover, since Rwould not hire a general if a coup
is certain, and Lemma 1 shows that G must remain
loyal when indifferent, it follows that in equilibrium
the probability of a coup must be zero. This leads to
the following result.
Lemma 2 Fix any social group bi. If R’s choices ensure
G’s loyalty, then R always picks the most competent
general from this group, θ, and endows him with
m∗i (T) =
⎧⎨
⎩max
(
0,
√
T
/
θ − T/ θ) if S(T) ≤ S∗i (T)
S∗i (T)
/
θ otherwise,
where
S∗i (T) =
bi + c+ cT+
√
(bi + c− cT)2 + 4cT
2[1− (bi + c)] (2)
is the maximum level of disloyalty that would not pro-
voke a coup, and
S(T) =
√
θT− T (3)
is the level of disloyalty for the most competent G with
resources optimally provided to deal with the external
threat. 
This tells us how Rwould allocate military resources
if doing so would preserve the loyalty of the general.
We now show when R would prefer to hire a general
given that she would have to ensure his loyalty.
Lemma 3 In equilibrium,
(i) R never hires G if the maximum competence is
worse than her own: θ < 1;
(ii) R always hires G with θ > 1 when the external
threat is sufficiently large: T ≥ 1;
(iii) R may or may not hire G with θ > 1 when T<
1, depending on the costs of a coup (c) and the
benefits from the status quo (bi). In particular, if
both are sufficiently small, then R will not hire
anyone. 
We have now established that the ruler will never
hire anyone less competent than herself and that when-
ever she chooses to hire a general, she picks the most
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competent one she can find. Moreover, if the external
threat is sufficiently serious, the ruler always hires a
general although she might have to ensure his loyalty
by providing him with fewer resources than what is
optimal for dealing with that threat.
Cases (i) and (iii) of Lemma 3 are substantively un-
likely. The former essentially means that no potential
general is more competent than the ruler, a highly
unlikely scenario (well, except perhaps if the ruler
is Napoleon, but even then there might be a poten-
tial Wellington!). The latter requires that the external
threat be negligible, in which case it is very easy to
trigger the disloyalty of any general, which is why the
decision to hire depends only on the benefits of the
status quo and the costs of a coup. Since the ruler’s
incentive to hire a general turns on a looming exter-
nal threat and the need to get someone competent to
deal with it, this case is irrelevant for our purposes.
Consequently, we shall exclude these substantively un-
appealing scenarios from further consideration:
Assumption 2 (Preference for Hiring) There always
exist generals more competent than the ruler (θ > 1),
and the external threat is never negligible (T ≥ 1).
Under Assumption 2, Lemma 3 implies that R will
always hire a general in equilibrium. The following re-
sult shows that, generally speaking, the ruler will give
preference to the privileged groups when it comes to
selecting a general.
Lemma 4Let b∗ be the unique solution to S∗i (T) = S(T).
If b≤ b∗, then R strictly prefers to pick G from b; other-
wise R is indifferent among any bi ∈ (b∗,b], and strictly
prefers any of them to any bi < b∗. 
Thus, R will either choose from the most privileged
group or from among the few most privileged (when
each of them provides enough benefits to ensure the
loyalty of generals drawn from them).Moreover,Rwill
always pick the most competent G she can although
she might have to handicap the general resource-wise
in order to ensure his loyalty. We can state the main
result somewhat loosely as follows:
Proposition 1 If the extent of the external threat is com-
mon knowledge and Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied,
then in any subgame-perfect equilibrium, the ruler picks
the most competent general. If there are groups that
derive sufficient benefits from the status quo to ensure
the loyalty of a general selected from them at the allo-
cation that is militarily optimal to deal with the external
threat, then the ruler chooses from any among them,
and endows the general with the optimal resources (the
equilibria are payoff-equivalent). If no such group ex-
ists, the ruler selects the general from the most privileged
group, and endows him with just enough resources to
ensure his loyalty. No coups occur in equilibrium, but
the external threat is not properly met when the ruler is
forced to handicap the general. 
We have thus established that when the size of the
threat is known, the Guardianship Dilemma is, in prin-
ciple, solvable: militaries remain loyal in equilibrium,
and the ruler’s strategy always privileges domestic po-
litical survival over dealing with the external threat.
The government hires competent generals, but con-
trols resource flows to the armed forces in order to
ensure military loyalty. Themore privileged the groups
from which the generals are selected, the less biting
the trade-off between stability (risk of a coup) and
security (risk from the external threat). Since the costs
of the coup act as a substitute for benefits, the more
effective anticoup measures, the less biting the trade-
off becomes and the less pressing the need to privilege
the military. In this way, “coup-proofing” works much
as previous studies suggest.
The very solvability of the dilemma and especially
the fact that whenever the trade-off between stabil-
ity and security exists it is always resolved in favor
of stability are puzzling given the frequency of mili-
tary interventions in politics. If rulers have levers for
controlling their armed forces, why are defections by
military forces such a regular occurrence?
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE
EXTERNAL THREAT
Let us now assume that onlyG observes the actual ex-
ternal threatT, whereasR is only imperfectly informed
about it. As before, subgame perfection implies that
given an allocation m, a general of competence θ who
obtains status quo benefits bi will execute a coup if, and
only if, the condition in Lemma 1 is not satisfied; i.e., if
the threat T is not sufficiently large to deter him. This
suggests that it will be sufficient to analyze the casewith
two types of threats: small and large, with 1 < TS < TL
(notice that we are maintaining Assumption 2). The
ruler believes that the threat is TS with probability
q ∈ (1, 0) and TL with complementary probability.
From the comparative statics on T, we know that
when threats become sufficiently large, the marginal
costs of military allocations begin to outweigh their
usefulness, soR responds by decreasingm even though
there is no danger of a coup. We consider it highly
implausible that a ruler will be so hampered by these
marginal costs that she would respond to more seri-
ous threats by reducing her spending on security. In-
stead of introducing a parameter for marginal costs
and requiring it to be sufficiently small given the max-
imum threat magnitude, we shall simply restrict the
threat to ensure that the optimal allocation is strictly
increasing in its size. This is already true when R con-
strains G, so this really only affects the unconstrained
allocation.
Assumption 3 (Reasonable Costs of Security) The
marginal costs of security are not so high as to cause
larger threats to require smaller countermeasures under
complete information: m∗i (TL) > m
∗
i (TS) > 0.
If R does not hire a general, her expected payoff is
UA = m
(
q
m+ TS +
1− q
m+ TL
)
−m,
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which has a unique optimal allocation that results in a
strictly positive payoff.
When R hires a general, any allocation can result in
one of three outcomes: a certain coup, no coup, and a
coup only if the threat is small. To see this, fix some m
and observe that if G stays loyal under TS given that
allocation, he must certainly do so under TL as well.
Conversely, if he executes a coup under TL, then he
must also do so under TS as well. The sole remaining
possibility is that he executes a coup under TS but re-
mains loyal under TL.
We begin by ruling out the possibility that the ruler
will hire anyone when she believes that doing so would
result in an inevitable coup (this parallels the complete-
information case).
Lemma 5 There is no equilibrium in which R hires G
when she expects a coup to occur with certainty. 
Thus, in any equilibrium in which R hires a general,
the general’s loyalty is either certain or else only in
doubt conditional on the actual size of the threat. The
following result shows two things. First, the ruler will
never hire anyone less competent than herself. Second,
the ruler’s strategy depends on her prior belief about
the magnitude of the threat. If she is sufficiently con-
vinced that the threat is large (i.e., q is small), then she
allocates more resources to G even though she knows
thatGwill execute a coup if the threat is, in fact, small.
The allocation is not, however, optimal for meeting TL
either because the possibility that it will be used in a
coup against her forces the ruler to curtail it a bit. In
this situation, the ruler faces a positive probability of
a coup and does not have enough forces to deal with
the large threat. If R is sufficiently convinced that the
threat is small (i.e., q is high), then she plays it safe: she
allocates just enough resources to ensure the loyalty of
G under the assumption that the threat is small. While
this does ensure that no coup takes place, the ruler will
find herself severely handicapped if the threat turns out
to be large.
Lemma 6Fix a social group bi and a level of competence
θ. In any equilibrium, R hires G only if θ > max(1,TS).
In the unique equilibrium inwhichRhiresG, there exists
a unique q∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that
• if q≤ q∗, then R allocates min(mC(q),m∗i (TL)),
wheremC(q) is the unique unconstrainedmaximizer
of R’s expected payoff, and G executes a coup if
the threat is TS but remains loyal otherwise (risky
strategy);
• if q> q∗, then R allocates m∗i (TS), and G remains
loyal (safe strategy).
When R plays the risky strategy, she not only faces a
positive probability of a coup from a general with sub-
stantial resources, but may also fail to provide adequate
resources to deal with the large threat. When R plays
the safe strategy, she certainly fails to provide adequate
resources for the large threat. 
Having established what resources R will allocate
once she has chosen G with some competence θ from
some class bi, we now ask how she makes these selec-
tions. Since Lemma 6 shows that hiring can only occur
if θ > max(1,TS), we shall assume that θ satisfies this
condition.
Lemma 7 Fix a social group bi. In any equilibrium, R
hires the most competent G she can (θ). 
Finally, we need to consider the social group from
which R selects the general. We first show that R’s
payoff is nondecreasing in bi if she pursues the riskless
strategy. Inparticular, it is constant inbi if the complete-
allocation optimum against TS is unconstrained, and
strictly increasing otherwise. Thus, starting with a very
low bi the payoff will not change, and increasing bi
eventually causes it to start increasing.
Lemma 8 Let b∗(T) denote the unique solution to
S(T) = S∗i (T). And let b1 = min(b∗(TS),b∗(TL)) and
b2 = max(b∗(TS),b∗(TL)). If b≤ b1, then R strictly
prefers to pick G from b. If b ∈ (b1,b2), then R strictly
prefers to pickGfrombfor q> q∗ if b1 = b∗(TS), and for
q≤ q∗ if b1 = b∗(TL), and is indifferent among any bi ∈
[b1,b] for any other q (but strictly prefers any of them
to bi < b1). If b≥ b2, then R is indifferent among any
bi ∈ [b2,b] (but strictly prefers any of them to bi < b2).
We can now state the main result under asymmetric
information.
Proposition 2 If only the general knows the extent of the
external threat, then in the essentially unique equilibrium
the ruler picks themost competent general from themost
privileged strata in society. If the ruler is sufficiently sure
that the threat is small, she provides the general with only
enough resources tomeet that threat (even thesemight be
constrained), and the general remains loyal regardless
of the extent of the threat. If the ruler is sufficiently sure
that the threat is large, she provides the general with
resources that balance the risk of a coup with the risk of
failing to meet the large threat with adequate resources
(even thesemight be insufficient for the large threat). The
general remains loyal if the threat is large but executes a
coup if the threat is small. 
Proof The result follows immediately from lemmata 6,
7, and 8. The equilibrium is essentially unique because
R might be indifferent among many values of bi as
long as they are sufficiently high. Each of these cor-
responds to a different equilibrium but they are all
payoff-equivalent. 
DISCUSSION
External Threats and Military (Dis)Loyalty
Although it appears to make perfect sense, the
Guardianship Dilemma turns out to be incomplete. It
begins with the premise that the threat environment
will create the need for armed forces, which in turn
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FIGURE 1. Military Endowment and Regime Stability with Known Threats
(a) R ’s allocation to G (b) R ’s probability of survival
will pose yet another risk for the regime, but fails to
consider what effect this environment will have on that
new risk. At best, the Guardianship Dilemma offers
a straightforward linear extrapolation: the worse the
threat environment, the greater the need for armed
forces, and, if this need is met, the larger the risk they
will pose.
What is missing in this logical chain, however, is the
simple fact that if the military does execute a coup
and take over the government, the original threat is
not going to magically disappear. The new rulers will
have to face many, if not all, of the same problems and
dangers that had confronted the old ones. The Malian
regime of Amadou Toumani Toure, for example, was
overthrown in a military coup d’etat in March 2012.
Even though the regime had been deposed by the
military, the state was still forced to deal with an ongo-
ing rebellion by Tuareg fighters (Nossiter 2012). Simi-
larly, Syria experienced no fewer than eight successful
coups d’etat between 1950 and 1970, when Hafez al-
Assad assumed power (Pipes 1989; Powell and Thyne
2010). Despite the frequent changes in rulership dur-
ing this period, relations between the Arab state and
its primary opponent, Israel, remained tense (Neff
1994).
The persistence of threats across regimes is a very
real and important consideration for military agents
who are considering whether or not to intervene in
politics. Because these forces must both overthrow the
regime and face the threat, external foes help to induce
loyalty by a state’s military forces. This “circling of the
wagons” effect is shown in Figure 1 a, where we focus
on threats that are at least moderately large (T> 1).4
If the external threat is grave enough (T ≥ T∗i (m, θ)),
rulers can devote the optimal allocation to defense
without triggering a coup. In the case of Iraq, President
Saddam Hussein was able to relax constraints on the
4 The parameters for all plots are b= 0.25, c = 0.30, θ = 16, TS = 1,
and TL = 4.
Iraqi military during the Iran-Iraq War principally be-
cause these forces were fighting for the survival of the
state (Hiro 1991; Pelletiere and Johnson 1991). How-
ever, rulers in this context must also defeat a stronger
threat, which discounts the probability of survival (see
Figure 1 b).
Alternatively, allocating the optimal amount of re-
sources for defense would trigger a coup when T<
T∗i (m, θ), leading to a strictly lower chance of survival
for the rulership. In this case, the ruler is safer by reduc-
ing the amount of resources that she devotes to defense
to the coup-constrained amount, even though this will
handicap the military. Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, for
example, led a regime that faced only moderate levels
of external threat for most of his 42 year rule. When it
came to managing the military, Qaddaf—who himself
had taken power in a coup—purposefully limited its
power in order to improve regime security (Lutterbeck
2013, 40).
By identifying circumstances under which rulers will
withhold resources from their militaries, our study
builds on the work of Besley and Robinson (2010),
who demonstrate that rulers will sometimes keep their
militaries smaller than optimal in order to ensure their
loyalty. Themechanismsdriving these constraints, how-
ever, are quite different. Constraints in the Besley
and Robinson (2010) model are a consequence of so-
cial conflict over public spending, which prevents the
regime from credibly committing to resource transfers.
Because the military’s loyalty cannot be purchased un-
der such conditions, constraints on the strength of the
armed forces are necessary to prevent defection. In
contrast, our model shows that constraints can be a
function of the threat environment even when rulers
can make credible commitments (in our model the re-
sources are given before the coup choice). Rulers can
leave themilitary unconstrained so long as the external
threat is sufficiently large, but must impose limitations
on their armed forces when faced with intermediate
threats.
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FIGURE 2. Threat Estimates and Resource Allocation
In one way, these theoretical results are consistent
with the basic claim of Desch (1999): militaries are
less willing to intervene when external threats loom
large. However, our model reveals that with a known
external threat, the loyalty of the military does not
depend on the size of that threat. The ruler can always
remain safe from a coup, whether the external threat
is small or large, by controlling the power of the armed
forces. This suggests that the mechanisms studied by
Desch cannot account for the dilemma despite identi-
fying the loyalty-inducing effects of larger threats. The
risk of military disloyalty is not due to variation in the
threat environment, but is instead triggered by another
factor, one that prevents rulers from calculating and
appropriating the correct level ofmilitary resources for
the given environment. This factor is the asymmetric
information that the military and the ruler might have
about the seriousness of the threat.
Disagreements about the Threat
Environment
Delegating the responsibility for defense to the armed
forces creates a less obvious, but, in many ways, more
vexing problem for rulers. Militaries are maintained
because they possess specialized skills and tools for as-
sessing and combating the state’s enemies. This special-
ization means that militaries will possess private infor-
mation about the nature of the threat environment—
information that we show is key for rulers who are
trying to navigate the Guardianship Dilemma. Rulers’
beliefs about the threat environment determine the
amount of resources they devote to the military, which,
in turn, drives both the risk of a coup and the ability to
defeat external threats.
Figure 2 shows that when the ruler believes the
threat to be small (q> q∗), she allocates a relatively
low level of resources to the military, which ensures
its loyalty whether the threat is actually small or large.
However, if the ruler mistakenly underestimates the
threat, she will allocate too few resources for facing the
large threat. While the ruler remains safe from a coup,
the regime is more vulnerable to external foes. This
danger is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the prob-
ability of regime survival as a function of the ruler’s
belief.
Alternatively, when the ruler believes the threat to
be large (q≤ q∗), she allocates a level of resources that
will trigger a coup if the threat is actually small, but
helps the regime defend against large threats. Because
rulers are strictly worse off in a coup, the risk of over-
estimating the threat is the most dangerous possibility
facing their regimes. As a result, even at this high tier
of resource allocation, the ruler hedges against the risk
of a coup by imposing slight constraints on the mili-
tary unless she is absolutely certain that the threat is
large. So when the ruler must deal with uncertainty, she
faces the possibility of either overestimating the threat
and risking a coup, or underestimating it and leaving
the state exposed to enemies. Rulers are safer when
responding appropriately to the given threat environ-
ment, and safest when facing a definite small threat.
These findings complement the work of researchers
like Svolik (2012) and Brooks (2008), who posit that
informational asymmetries can complicate the civil-
military relations within states as well as the response
of regimes to external threats. While Svolik (2012,
2013) focuses on the case in which military agents
are asymmetrically informed about the policies insti-
tuted by a regime, we outline the difficulties that arise
from the private information that militaries gain while
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FIGURE 3. The Divergence of Threat Estimates and Regime Security
fulfilling their responsibilities as guardians of the state.
In this way, we characterize the essence of the dilemma
inherent in civil-military relations: the competencies
that make military agents effective also make them a
threat.5
Relating the Model to Empirical Work
A small, but growing, body of scholarship analyzes
correlations between coups and variables that could
be interpreted in terms of our model. We now discuss
how one might account for these empirical regularities
with themechanism it identifies, while also highlighting
the additional assumptions one would need to make
and the difficulties with positing some of the direct
relationships suggested by these studies.
The model predicts that external threats help to in-
ducemilitary loyalty, though civilian control ultimately
depends on whether or not the ruler possesses accurate
information about the threat environment. In this con-
text, it is useful to consider the empirical results of two
studies that find that the probability of coups is lower
if the country is involved in a war and even in a crisis
(Arbatli and Arbatli 2014). The explanatory mecha-
nisms these studies offer are different (although not
necessarily incompatible) argue that when the military
is engaged in a war there are fewer opportunities for
a coup and more uncertainty about who will join it,
whereas Arbatli and Arbatli (2014) argue that crises
allow rulers to commit credibly to transfers to the mili-
tary and to generate rally-around-the-flag effects. Even
5 We discuss why the military may withhold information about the
threat environment in Online Appendix C.
though either one or both of these mechanisms could
be relevant, it is worth noting that our model could
produce these predictions in a very straightforward
manner.
Since the key variable is the extent of disagreement
about the severity of the threat, which is difficult to
measure directly, one might wish to conceptualize the
uncertainty about the threat in terms of factors that
make it more or less likely for such disagreements to
arise. For instance, an ongoing war would be indicative
of a fairly serious threat that neither the military nor
the ruler could possibly be in doubt about. Moreover,
since longer wars can potentially reveal more informa-
tion (Slantchev 2003), the longer the war, the less likely
disagreement should be. Analogously, a crisis could in-
dicate a somewhat less severe threatwith somepossible
disagreements because of diverging estimates about
the likely outcome of the crisis. When the country is at
peace and not involved in a crisis, on the other hand,
there is no clear evidence that could force the political
and military estimates to converge: since all threats
are purely hypothetical at that point, the possibilities
for different opinions relying on difference pieces of
information would proliferate. The longer the peace
spell, the more likely are these differences to become
serious disagreements.
In other words, one might think of disagreement as a
continuous variable, proxied by how long the country
has been at peace, whether it is involved in a crisis,
and whether it is actively fighting. The model would
then predict that coups are most likely when there is
peace (and the longer the peace spell, the higher the
probability of a coup), significantly less likely when
the country is involved in a crisis, and quite unlikely
when it is involved in a war (and the longer the war,
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the lower the probability of a coup). Thus, our model
can account for the correlations found by both of these
analyses without having to resort to different explana-
tory mechanisms.
While uncertainty about the severity of the threat
has a straightforward direct effect, its role as a media-
tor for the effects of other variables is more complex.
Consider, for instance, the problem of relating the mil-
itary’s endowment to the probability of a coup, which
is the subject of a study by Powell (2012). Using an
expected utility framework, Powell (2012, 1021) notes
that the military would be more likely to execute a
coup if it anticipates high benefits from doing so, and
if it believes that it has a high probability of success.
He then argues that higher (or increasing) levels of
funding per soldier will lower the probability of coups
(Hypothesis 1) but make coups more likely to succeed
(Hypothesis 5), which he considers a paradox (Powell
2012, 1025).
Relating these two hypotheses to variables in our
model is not as easy as one might think because of the
way they treat military resources. The model’s basic
assumption is that Hypothesis 5 is correct: this is built
into the functional form of the probability of success,
which increases in the amount of resources controlled
by the military. Furthermore, the model also assumes
that these resources cannot be used to increase directly
the benefit of a coup, as the reasoning behind Hypoth-
esis 1 would have it. On the other hand, the model
does allow the ruler to select generals frommore privi-
leged groups, which decreases the potential gains from
a coup, but does not allow this to influence the prob-
ability of success. We think that there are substantial
analytical benefits to be had from keeping these effects
separate.After all, even if resources are in the infinitely
fungible medium of money, it is not a simple matter
to explain how they could create the supposed para-
dox: higher salaries would not necessarily translate into
better training, while purchasing better military equip-
ment would not necessarily yield the military higher
benefits from the status quo.
Since Powell’s (2012) statistical analysis uses the
government’s military expenditures, which include ev-
erything from salaries to equipment—not to mention
cases where a significant chunk of the military budget
goes to civilian contractors and employees, which in-
creases neither the status quo benefits of the military
nor its ability to prevail in a coup—to measure the
resources made available to the military, it is not pos-
sible to map the findings to the model. Unfortunately,
neither it is possible to draw the conclusions he does
from that analysis. For instance, one of the findings
is that contrary to Hypothesis 5, larger expenditures
do not increase the probability of coup success. This
would be just as stunning if the spending was on better
training, better equipment, and better organization, as
it would be trivial if it was on better salaries, health
and pension benefits, and other perks. In other words,
without disaggregating military expenditures to distin-
guish between spending that could potentially improve
the capabilities from spending that is designed to im-
prove the status quo benefits of themilitary, one cannot
take this finding as contradicting the assumption of our
model that resources designed to improve capabilities
would increase the probability of success. Instead, the
model’s clear conceptual distinction highlights a vague
and under-theorized aspect of the explanatory mecha-
nism that generates Hypothesis 5.
It is perhaps even more interesting to attempt to
relateHypothesis 1 to themodel, at least when it comes
to the causal mechanism. (Obviously we cannot make
much of the correlation findings here either for the
reasons discussed above.) Powell’s (2012) hypothesis
is that better-endowed militaries (or those that enjoy
an increase in resources) should be less likely to stage
a coup. Since under complete information about the
threat the probability of a coup is constant at zero
in equilibrium, any variation has to come from the
asymmetric information case, where the relationship
between resources and coup probability is mediated
by the extent of disagreement about that threat.
On one hand, Figure 2 seems to predict precisely the
opposite relationship to the one stated in Hypothesis
1: the only positive risk of a coup happens when the
ruler is sufficiently convinced that the threat is large
and so provides the military with a lot of resources
(q≤ q∗). Since in all other cases the ruler opts for the
small allocation and no risk, one might be tempted to
conclude that militaries with more resources are more
likely to execute a coup. However, if we consider the
dynamics in the range of the parameter space where a
risk of a coup exists, we find something different. As
the plot shows, the military’s allocation is increasing in
the ruler’s belief that the threat is large.Recall now that
in equilibrium the military executes a coup only when
the threat is actually small and assume that the ruler is
not deluded on average (meaning that as her belief that
the threat is large goes up, the actual probability that it
is small is also going down). In this situation, we would
expect the probability of a coup to be decreasing as the
resources increase. Overall, the model would lead us
to expect that militaries with fewer resources do not
generally engage in coups, but also that when coups do
occur, militaries with more resources are less likely to
have caused them. While the latter is consistent with
Powell’s (2012) findings, we should not read this as
some sort of unequivocal support for the model: after
all, our mechanism does depend on the crucial inter-
vening variable of the degree of disagreement, and
this is naturally absent in the estimations that take a
completely different mechanism as their hypothesized
data-generating process.
Some of the most influential work on civil-military
relations emphasizes the importance of structural de-
terminants of military disloyalty (Zimmermann 1983).
When the regime lacks legitimacy, the economy is bad,
or the culture is permissive of military interference in
politics, the likelihood that themilitary will seize power
is said to increase (Finer 1988; Londregan and Poole
1990). Additionally, Powell (2012, 1030) also argues
that institutional coup-proofing measures—such as
having parallel military or paramilitary forces, or an ex-
tensive security and domestic surveillance apparatus—
would reduce the likelihood of coup success and finds
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not only that they do but that they also reduce the risk
of coups.
One parameter in our model can represent some
of these factors: the costs of executing the coup that
the general pays. Although these costs do not affect
the probability of prevailing if the coup is executed,
they do affect the incentive to launch a coup because
they determine the overall expected benefit of doing so.
The effect of this parameter is indirect and transmitted
through the way it affects the optimal resource allo-
cation. The complete-information allocation is nonde-
creasing in these costs: ifm∗i (T) is at the unconstrained
optimum, then it is independent of the costs, and if it
is at the constrained optimum, it is strictly increasing
because S∗i (T) is. In other words, when the structural
factors increase the costs of a coup, the ruler can safely
provide the military with larger allocations, which are
helpful against the external threat.
It can be demonstrated that this means that both the
safe and the risky payoffs are nondecreasing and that
q∗ is nonincreasing. This means that under asymmetric
information an increase in the costs of a coup results
in generally larger allocations for the military and an
expansion of the range where the ruler opts for the
safe strategy (so a decrease in the ex ante risk of a
coup). Thus, the expectations derived from the model
are consistent with the empirical findings about the
importance of structural variables.
Selecting the Generals, Part 1: Privilege
The model provides a rationale for leaders who select
from privileged social groups when filling key military
positions, corroborating the work of scholars who em-
phasize the importance of social, economic, or political
ties as determinants ofmilitary recruitment andpromo-
tion. Members of groups receiving relatively lucrative
benefits from the status quo political arrangement have
less incentive to overthrow the regime, making them
attractive candidates for positions within the military.
It can be shown that increasing these benefits has essen-
tially the same effect as increasing the costs of a coup.
Thus, increasing b allows the ruler to provide more
resources to the military without increasing the risk
of a coup. Under asymmetric information, this results
in nondecreasing payoffs from both the safe and the
risky strategies, as well as nonincreasing q∗ (that is,
an expanding region where the ruler opts for the safe
strategy).
The model leads us to expect that rulers who en-
gage in exclusionary selection practices and choose
their military from a restricted group of privileged
elites will face a lower risk of a coup and will do
better against external threats. Conversely, rulers who
for some reason are unable to limit their selection to
such a group but must admit representatives of other,
less privileged, groups would have a higher risk of a
coup and will generally performworse against external
threats.
It is not difficult tofindexamples of rulers engaging in
exclusionary practices when it comes to theirmilitaries.
After the 1965 coup and 1966 dissolution of the monar-
chy in Burundi, most of the 17 military officers in the
National Revolutionary Council came from the ruling
Tutsi minority, while only three belonged to the Hutu
ethnic majority (Kaufman and Haklai 2008, 752). In
South Africa during Apartheid, whites dominated the
military leadership and were the only group allowed to
fulfill combat roles. Nonwhites serving in the military
were relegated to supporting positions, such as making
food or fixing equipment, that did not provide direct
access to coercive force (Enloe 1975, 24).
It is perhapsmore interesting to compare themodel’s
expectations to an empirical study that uses a dif-
ferent explanatory mechanism to derive its hypothe-
ses. Roessler (2011) argues that coups in sub-Saharan
Africa are triggered by an internal security dilemma
that arises out of the inability of elites to commit to
cooperating with each other to maintain their hold
on power. Rulers suspicious of the loyalty of some
elites take precautionary coup-proofing measures that
increase the anxiety of these elites, which makes them
more prone to violence. If the ruler succeeds in ex-
cluding these elites from the coercive apparatus, this
violence takes the form of a civil war, but if the
ruler fails to exclude them, the violence takes the
form of a coup. Because rulers cannot observe loy-
alty directly, they use ethnicity as an informational
shortcut, “an expedient mechanism to eradicate per-
ceived enemies at a time of high uncertainty” (Roessler
2011, 313).
Our model has no concept of loyalty as an attribute
of the potential general. Instead, loyalty is represented
by the decision not to execute a coup, making it an en-
dogenous quantity that is determined by the incentives
generated from the combination of resources, com-
petence, benefits, and threat environment. Thus, the
model does not allow for the use of ethnicity as a cue
for loyalty. If, however, ethnicity is a proxy for privilege
(as it would be in most cases), the model rationalizes
exclusionary ethnic practices simply as a way to en-
sure higher status quo benefits for the general.6 In this
way, the model yields predictions that are remarkably
similar to the internal security dilemma story: rulers
will attempt to select the commanders of their coercive
apparatus mostly from their own ethnic group (which
would be privileged in other ways), and in those cases
they will be at a lower risk of a coup.
One might also want to think of some additional
insights provided by our mechanism. For instance,
Roessler (2011, 314–6) makes a compelling argument
that while ethnic exclusion can “terminate the internal
security dilemma...it leaves the regime vulnerable to a
future civil war.” One might wonder why rulers would
make such a trade-off, especially because Roessler
(2011, 314–5) simply asserts that civil war somehow
“poses less of a threat to their political supremacy.” In
contrast, our model suggests straightforward reasons
for such a substitution effect. If elites are known to be
6 See Esteban and Ray (2008) for reasons conflict might arise along
ethnic rather than class lines.
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disgruntled following their exclusion, they will repre-
sent a larger known threat to the regime. As we have
seen, under these circumstances, the ruler will respond
with increased military spending while simultaneously
facing a lower risk of a coup from within. Because the
larger threat has a “circling the wagons” effect that
lowers the incentives for a coup, the ruler can counter
the external threat more effectively. A simple exten-
sion of our model that allows the ruler to exacerbate
that threat shows that the ruler does have a very strong
incentive todo so (McMahon2014). In otherwords, our
mechanism can explain a crucial trade-off that is not
part of the internal security dilemma mechanism and
as such needs to be asserted to make that explanation
work.
Selecting the Generals, Part 2: Competence
Many studies suggest that agents chosen on the basis of
their ties to the ruler are less effective, since perceived
loyalty is emphasized over merit and competence dur-
ing the selection process (Brooks 2008; Gaub 2013;
Quinlivan 1999). As we noted above, we regard loyalty
as a consequence rather than an attribute, although
one might wish to consider the use of a privileged
group as a measure of ties to the ruler. The model
very clearly shows that the commonly argued trade-
off between loyalty and competence imposes a false
choice on rulers, whose optimal strategy is to select the
most competent general while simultaneously increas-
ing the probability that he will remain loyal.7 More-
over, it is precisely the agent’s ties to the regime that
permit rulers to endow the military with additional
resources. One should not be surprised to learn that
when the Syrianmilitary received advanced T-72 tanks,
these weapons systems were distributed first to units
deemed to be closest to the Assad regime because
they were led by co-ethnic Alawites and sometimes
even by members of the Assad family (Bennett 2001;
Quinlivan 1999, 147). Since more competent agents
that command more resources are better positioned to
deal with external threats, the model also contradicts
the notion that these militaries must be of low quality.8
Since a key hypothesis that emerges from our analy-
sis is that rulers alwayswant to hire themost competent
generals, we should like to take a closer look at a fa-
mous instance that seems to contradict that claim: Sad-
dam Hussein’s choice of high-ranking military officers.
As we noted above, the Iraqi president exerted control
over the appointments of hismilitary commanders, giv-
ing priority to groups with close ties to the regime. In
particular, Hussein favored those with whomhe shared
common traits—mainly fellow Ba’athists and Sunni-
Arabs, as well as privileged men from the area around
7 This is true as long as the privileged group also contains competent
agents, a likely scenario given that privilege often results in access to
better education and healthcare.
8 Egorov and Sonin (2011) argue that rulers purposefully select in-
competent agents as a way to minimize their exposure to the risk
of a coup. Our model considers the potential risks associated with
incompetence, and draws much different conclusions.
his hometown of Tikrit—when choosing personnel for
particularly sensitive tasks (al-Marashi 2002).
When Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, many
of these loyalist officers proved to be incompetent
military leaders, resulting in a painstakingly slow ad-
vance into Iranian territory. The sluggish pace of the
advance allowed the Iranian military, still reeling in
the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the time
to coalesce into a force capable of pushing the Iraqis
backwards (Hiro 1991; Pelletiere and Johnson 1991).
Hussein reacted by replacing many of these comman-
ders, and as a result the performance of the Iraqi armed
force markedly improved.
It would be easy to use this case as an example of a
ruler privileging loyalty over competence when select-
ing military agents, and the deleterious effects of this
type of decision-making calculus. However, it is impor-
tant to dig a bit deeper to understand the decision-
making calculus of the Hussein regime, and the con-
sequences of these decisions for military effectiveness.
First of all, evidence suggests that Saddam Hussein
was selecting for both competence and privilege when
appointing officers to military positions prior the war.
Woods et al. (2011, 14) write that “At the war’s outset,
Saddam was heavily influenced by Ba’ath ideology. He
believed that any Ba’ath leader could, at the same
time, be a competent military commander.” In fact,
the regime had a famous slogan: “al-askari al-jayyid
huwa al-Baathi al-jayyid,” which means “the good mil-
itary man is the good Baathist” (Parasiliti and Antoon
2000, 134).
In other words, not only did Hussein not regard the
selection from the privilegedBaathist elite as some sort
of substitute for competence, he seems to have thought
that membership in the party was a good indicator of
high military competence. His behavior is thus in line
with the model’s expectations.
As it turned out, Hussein was mistaken about the
direct relationship between membership in the privi-
leged group and competence. Since ourmodel assumes
that competence is directly observable, it does not al-
low for such mistakes. In its present form, the model
cannot account for Hussein’s initial choice. However,
if our model is right, then Hussein’s intention must
have been to select competent generals. This implies
that upon realizing that he had made a mistake, Hus-
sein should immediately have moved to correct it by
making appropriate replacements. Since performance
in war can be regarded as a direct test of competence,
the fact thatHussein did replace unsuccessful comman-
ders with successful ones can be taken as evidence that
supports our model. Moreover, the fact that Hussein
continued to select from the privileged group lends
further support to our model and undermines the idea
of a trade-off between loyalty and competence.9
We can take our analysis further and turn Hussein’s
apparent mistake to our analytical advantage. Some
9 Pelletiere and Johnson (1991, 59) note this trend: “Most of Iraq’s
higher level commanders appear to havebeenpolitically reliable pro-
fessionals after 1982. Indeed, from 1984 on, the issue of competence
seems to have been the principal deciding factor for advancement.”
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TABLE 1. 1987–88 Iraqi Military High
Command After Iran-Iraq War
Outcome Number Relative Freq.
Held same position 11 0.41
Were promoted 8 0.30
Death in combat 1 0.04
Death in accident 1 0.04
Retirement 2 0.07
Unknown 4 0.15
Total 27 1.01
Notes: Career trajectories for the men who held posi-
tions in the Iraqi military high command during 1987
or 1988. Outcomes determined by the status of each
individual between the end of the Iran-Iraq war and
1990/1.
studies suggest that while the loyalty-competence
trade-off is real, large external threats can swamp the
fear of a coup and cause the ruler to focusmore on com-
petence rather than loyalty (Talmadge 2013). If such a
decision is conditional on the level of threat, then the
choice of competent commanders must be transient:
The diminution of the threat must cause the ruler to
revert to form. In this instance, after the war’s end
Hussein would be expected to replace the competent,
but now dangerous, generals with incompetent cronies.
Our model, on the other hand, would lead us to expect
precisely the opposite outcome because the incentive
to select the most competent general is independent of
the level of threat. Since performance in the war has
allowed him to identify the competent commanders,
Hussein would be expected to retain them after the
war’s end.
In order to assess these divergent expectations, we
identify the senior leaders of the Iraqi armed forces—
members of the high command—during the last two
years of the Iran-Iraq War (1987 and 1988). The
high command is inclusive to a variety of senior mil-
itary leadership positions, from commander-in-chief
Saddam Hussein and the minister of defense to the
commanders of the navy and the seven army corps
(Bengio 1989, 1990). After determining the individuals
whoheld thesekeyposts,we tracked their career trajec-
tories for the first few years after the war to determine
if they were purged.
In all, we were able to track the postwar career
trajectories for 23 of the 27 members of the 1987/88
military high command (see Online Appendix B). We
excluded Hussein himself (the 28th commander) from
this analysis. The data reveal that Hussein continued to
employ a sizable majority of his senior military leaders
after the war. As is shown in Table 1, almost three-
quarters of the generals continued to hold the same po-
sition or were promoted by the regime. This evidence,
while it is only suggestive, provides support for the
predictions of our theory: Hussein kept his war-proven
military commanders after the war. There is no post-
war information for four of the generals who served in
the high command, possibly because they were purged
by the regime. Yet even if we were to assume that
all four were purged, it would mean that Hussein re-
tained 76 percent of the still-living members of the
high command from 1987/88 for at least two years after
the war.
Hussein’s actions clearly demonstrate a ruler who
was seeking both to maximize competence and en-
sure loyalty while selecting military officers. The Iraqi
regime used the crucible of war to identify competent
commanders, and then continued to rely on these in-
dividuals after the fighting had ended. While our ev-
idence is limited to the senior leadership of the Iraqi
armed forces, we believe that the calculus driving the
decisions of rulers like Hussein is most evident among
these individuals, who are both highly influential and
visible within the state. Focusing on the high command
also allows us to avoid confusing political calculations
with the downsizing that occurs among the ranks of
most militaries following long and costly wars.
CONCLUSION
Examining the Guardianship Dilemma allows us to
make several contributions to the study of political
instability in general, and civil-military relations more
specifically. First, the same threats that necessitate the
creation of a military for defense also help to keep
this force loyal. Ultimately, the pernicious effects of
theGuardianshipDilemma are due primarily to rulers’
uncertainty about the threat environment, rather than
the severity of these threats. Second, rulers in coup-
prone states are better off by staffing their militaries
with persons from privileged groups, since regimes can
actually increase the fighting power of their armed
forces through selective appointments. If individuals
with a higher status quo benefit have less incentive
to overthrow the regime, they can be trusted with
more coercive power. Third, rulers also select generals
on the basis of their competence, since a competent
commander can more effectively manage the state’s
military resources. While this competence increases
the likelihood that a coup will succeed if attempted,
rulers prefer to manage the generals’ loyalty by re-
stricting the resources that flow to militaries, rather
than by appointing dolts who will waste what they are
given.
While the model enables us to characterize the most
basic features of the dilemma, further research is nec-
essary to extend and refine these insights. A useful
first step would be to examine whether the Guardian-
ship Dilemma depends on the source of the threat
facing the state, especially in the context of foreign
versus domestic enemies. While previous research pre-
dicts that civil-military relations differ drastically on
the basis of whether the threat comes from within
or outside of states’ borders (Desch 1999), the dy-
namics we outline exist in the presence of any threat
that endangers the government. Dissimilar threats
may, however, differentially affect the variables that
impinge upon the dilemma, changing the extent to
which rulers must relax or impose constraints on their
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armed forces. Theremay also exist levels of uncertainty
about the strategic environment that vary systemat-
ically across unlike threats. While these differences
are likely to be manifest in the empirical record, it
would be worthwhile to explore whether or not this
variation in behavior is due to the same underlying
mechanism.
Another step would be to analyze an extension to
the model in which the interaction between military
and political elites takes place over multiple periods.
The game in our model ends when the external threat
is faced. In practice, of course, whoever is in charge of
the state must continue to rule. If the military has been
endowedwith the resources to face a threat, the sudden
termination of this loyalty-inducing threat could put
the regime in grave danger, leading rulers to prefer
enduring hostilities with opponents. In this, it may be
possible to develop a civil-military logic for the cul-
tivation of rivalries. One could also explore how the
actions of rulers might change if the competence of
potential generals is hard to observe, as it was initially
for Saddam Hussein. The model reveals that know-
ing the competence of the military leadership is im-
portant for rulers who are calibrating an appropriate
response to external threats and the risk of a coup,
and that, consequently, uncertainty about competence
could potentially be costly or dangerous (or both!) for
the regime. As a result, we may identify rulers who
invest in military academies, conduct exercises, or use
the process of fighting in conflict to separate the types
of military officers in their armed forces.
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